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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1255 
 ___________ 
 
 YU ZHAN LIN, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A087-978-693) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2013 
 
 Before: FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  September 16, 2013) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yu Zhan Lin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 
final order of removal.  We will deny the petition. 
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I. 
 Lin is a citizen of China who entered the United States without having been 
admitted or paroled and who concedes that he is removable on that basis.  Lin applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”) on the ground that he suffered and fears mistreatment for having resisted 
China’s family planning policies.  Lin and his wife have one child (both his wife and 
child remain in China).  Lin claims that, when his wife became pregnant again, Chinese 
authorities forced her to have an abortion.  Lin further claims that he confronted the 
officials, who “hit” and “beat” him and then called police to accuse him of having 
attacked them.  The police beat Lin with batons, causing bruising on his “body, back, 
legs, everywhere,” and then detained him for eight days.  When the police released him, 
they warned him that that they would put him in jail if he “caused trouble” again.  Lin did 
not seek or require medical treatment for his injuries, and he left for the United States 
approximately one year later. 
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Lin credible but denied relief.  In particular, 
the IJ concluded that Lin’s mistreatment did not rise to the level of persecution and that 
he had not otherwise shown a well-founded fear of persecution because his fear of again 
being punished by Chinese authorities was too speculative.  The IJ further concluded that 
Lin had not shown a likelihood of persecution for purposes of withholding of removal or 
a likelihood of torture for purposes of CAT.  The BIA dismissed Lin’s appeal after 
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finding no basis to disturb the IJ’s conclusions.  Lin petitions for review.1  
II. 
 The Government argues that Lin has waived all issues on review because he has 
raised no specific challenge to any aspect of the BIA’s decision.  It is true that Lin does 
not expressly assert that the BIA erred in any particular respect, but his brief can be read 
to assert two challenges to its ruling.  Each lacks merit. 
 First, Lin argues that his mistreatment by Chinese authorities constitutes past 
persecution giving rise to a rebuttable presumption that he has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in the future.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).  
“While this Court has not yet drawn a precise line concerning where a simple beating 
ends and persecution begins, our cases suggest that isolated incidents that do not result in 
serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.”  Voci, 409 F.3d at 615.  We have 
held on numerous occasions that mistreatment similar to Lin’s is of that kind.  See, e.g., 
Chen, 381 F.3d at 223, 234-35 (beating by family planning officials that did not require 
medical treatment together with fiancee’s forced abortion); Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 191 
(two detentions and a beating that resulted in bruising but that did not require medical 
                                                 
1
 We review the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions together because the BIA both agreed with the 
IJ’s decision and added some of its own reasoning.  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 612-
13 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the IJ’s factual findings for substantial evidence and may 
not disturb them unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 
the contrary.”  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  “Whether an applicant has demonstrated past persecution is a 
factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”  Jarbough v. 
Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 
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attention).  Lin argues that his mistreatment rises to the level of persecution when 
considered cumulatively with his wife’s forced abortion, but the BIA expressly 
considered them in the aggregate (BIA Dec. at 2), and we cannot say that the evidence 
compelled it to conclude to the contrary.  See Chen, 381 F.3d at 223, 234-35 (rejecting 
argument that “the beatings [petitioner] suffered at the hands of government officials 
combine with the forced abortion . . . in such a way as to constitute past persecution”). 
 Second, Lin challenges the BIA’s ruling that he did not otherwise show a well-
founded fear of persecution.  The BIA concluded that Lin had not shown an objectively 
reasonable possibility of being subject to persecution on the speculative ground that he 
might have more children in the future.  See Voci, 409 F.3d at 613.  Lin argues that the 
Agency failed to consider whether he might be persecuted on account of his altercation 
with family planning officials, but the BIA’s analysis accounts for that possibility.  Lin 
testified that Chinese authorities warned him upon his release that “if, in the future, I 
cause trouble again, they will put me in jail.”  (A.R. 105.)  Thus, Lin’s own testimony 
provides no reason to believe that Chinese officials will show any interest in him unless 
he “cause[s] trouble again,” presumably by violating or resisting the family planning 
laws.  The BIA adequately addressed why that speculative possibility does not make him 
eligible for relief.
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For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
2
 Lin asserts that he is entitled to withholding of removal and relief under CAT because 
he has satisfied the standard for asylum.  Lin has not satisfied the standard for asylum, 
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and even if he had it would not establish his entitlement to these different forms of relief. 
